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ABSTRACT
Highly automated robot ecologies (HARE), or societies of in-
dependent autonomous robots or agents, are rapidly becoming
an important part of much of the world’s critical infrastructure.
As with human societies, regulation, wherein a governing body
designs rules and processes for the society, plays an important
role in ensuring that HARE meet societal objectives. However,
to date, a careful study of interactions between a regulator and
HARE is lacking. In this paper, we report on three user studies
which give insights into how to design systems that allow peo-
ple, acting as the regulatory authority, to effectively interact
with HARE. As in the study of political systems in which
governments regulate human societies, our studies analyze
how interactions between HARE and regulators are impacted
by regulatory power and individual (robot or agent) autonomy.
Our results show that regulator power, decision support, and
adaptive autonomy can each diminish the social welfare of
HARE, and hint at how these seemingly desirable mechanisms
can be designed so that they become part of successful HARE.
Author Keywords
Human-agent interaction; HARE; autonomy; regulation
INTRODUCTION
Centuries of political discourse have led to diverse philoso-
phies for how to best govern human societies. Political opin-
ions advocate everything from highly controlled societies (au-
thoritarianism) to loosely controlled societies (e.g., libertarian-
ism), and just about everything in between. Political philoso-
phies differ with respect to the extent of power and resources
given to governments, as well as the rights and autonomy of
individuals in society (e.g., [11, 19, 32]).
Preprint to appear in HAI 2017, Bielefeld, Germany.
Similar discourse is necessary in the context of highly au-
tomated robot ecologies (HARE), which are collections of
independent and autonomous robots, agents, or software sys-
tems that share constrained resources. For example, it is not
hard to imagine future transportation systems composed al-
most entirely of independent driverless cars. Other aspects of
modern cities, including smart grids and smart buildings, con-
sist of networks of autonomous robotic devices that compete
for and share (potentially constrained) water and electricity
resources. Similarly, investor behavior in financial markets is
increasingly driven by sophisticated control algorithms. As
in the governing of human societies, regulators (or regulatory
authorities) consisting of one or more people are given re-
sources and power to influence the behavior of these HARE.
The goal of these human-agent interactions is to ensure that
shared resources are effectively and appropriately utilized.
Despite similarities between regulating human and robot soci-
eties, there are also glaring differences, not the least of which
is that individual and collective robot behavior is often quite
distinct from human behavior. Robots and other AIs can some-
times respond to stimuli instantaneously and in mass in ways
that people cannot [15]. Likewise, robots are not likely to
respond identically to regulations (e.g., information, incen-
tives, and force) as people, nor might they be afforded the
same rights. Thus, given the rapid rise of HARE in modern
critical infrastructure, it is important that we study interactions
between HARE and regulatory authorities in order to design
systems that meet societal objectives.
In this paper, we study, via three user studies, how to design
systems that allow people, acting as the regulatory authority, to
effectively govern HARE. As in the study of political systems,
our studies analyze, under an initial set of assumptions, how
simple HARE are impacted by regulatory power and individual
(robot) autonomy. Results show that regulator power, decision
support, and adaptive robot autonomy can each diminish the
social welfare of the HARE in some conditions, and suggest
how these seemingly desirable mechanisms can be used so
that they become part of more successful HARE.
While these user studies and the associated analysis do not
(and, indeed, cannot) provide universal or general statements
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about all HARE, the intended contribution of this paper is to
raise awareness of the potential pitfalls and opportunities that
should be considered in the design of real-world HARE.
INTERACTING WITH HARE
Before describing the user studies, we discuss HARE and the
regulator authority’s role in interacting with HARE.
HARE
A highly automated robot ecology (HARE) is a collection of
independent and autonomous robots that either share resources
or participate in the same activity. Both the terms independent
and autonomous deserve explanations. The robots are inde-
pendent from each other in that they are owned by different
stakeholders. No one person or organization owns all robots
in the collective, as individual stakeholders decide the goals
and algorithms used by their robots. This independence in
ownership and design (and, hence, goals and algorithms) does
not imply that the robots do not impact each other. The robots
may communicate with each other. Furthermore, each robot’s
environment is impacted by the other robots’ actions.
In a HARE, the robots are autonomous in that, from the
regulator’s perspective, they make their own decisions. A
regulatory authority cannot interrupt or override the robots’
decision-making algorithms without the permission of their
stakeholders. However, the regulator may change the robots’
environment (by supplying information, providing incentives,
changing physical infrastructure, etc.) to influence them.
Each robot’s behavior is determined by its control algorithm.
Financial incentives and other objectives often drive stake-
holders to equip their robots with sophisticated and adaptive
control algorithms [1, 40, 24] designed to maximize the in-
dividual stakeholders’ benefits rather than societal objectives.
As such, collective behavior often fails to meet societal goals.
The extent to which HARE fall short of desirable societal
outcomes is known as the price of anarchy [17, 21, 10].
Regulation
Since the price of anarchy can be quite high [41], regulatory
authorities are established to set rules and incentives that pro-
mote system-wide stability and efficiency. For example, a
transportation authority assigned to regulate driverless cars
can use road structure, information, and penalties and incen-
tives (e.g., tolls or ticketing) to promote efficient and safe
traffic flow. Regulators of new-age power systems can use
contracts [23], information-based interventions [33], and real-
time pricing [2] to influence robotic buildings to reduce peak
consumption and match electricity demand to supply. In each
case, the regulatory authority can potentially reduce the price
of anarchy by altering the robots’ environment.
Interactions between regulatory authorities and HARE bring
to mind mechanism design [12], supervisory control (SC) of
multiple robots [5, 43], and systems with shared autonomy [7,
13, 26]. These research areas have both key similarities and
differences with regulating HARE. We discuss each in turn.
Relation to Mechanism Design
The regulatory authority engineers the environment to encour-
age cooperation among robots in the HARE. Cooperation is
most easily achieved by either influencing the robots to con-
verge to a more efficient equilibrium or to alter the scenario so
that it has a unique, more efficient equilibrium. This later prob-
lem, called mechanism design [12] (i.e., reverse game theory),
has been applied to many domains including power grids [38],
financial markets [20] and transportation systems [42, 34].
The goal of mechanism design is to implement strategy-proof
mechanisms (e.g., payment schemes) that incentivize agents
to truthfully reveal their private information [12, 27]. Un-
fortunately, such mechanisms do not always exist, especially
in online and dynamic settings [27, 30, 29]. Furthermore,
computational complexity and privacy concerns often prohibit
incentive-compatible mechanisms from being implemented
even when they do exist in theory [22, 28, 9]. In HARE, neces-
sary prior knowledge required to implement such mechanisms
(e.g., the robots’ state and action spaces) [12, 27], is often not
immediately available, and it is often not possible to obtain this
information through auctions or similar revealed-preference
mechanisms in a timely fashion [25, 36, 4]. Therefore, the
regulator must experiment in real time to identify interventions
that produce desirable societal outcomes.
Relation to Supervisory Control
Human-HARE interactions also call to mind traditional
supervisory-control (SC) systems in which an operator di-
rects multiple (semi-autonomous) robots (e.g., [5, 43]). While
we anticipate that these operators face similar challenges as
regulators of HARE (e.g., situation awareness [8] and operator
workload), there are critical differences. For example, robots
in HARE are autonomous (level 10) from the regulator’s per-
spective, while robots in SC systems typically operate at a
lower level of automation [35]. Thus, in SC, operators can
directly override or alter the robots’ decision-making, algo-
rithms, or goals. Regulators of HARE cannot.
Relation to Shared Autonomy
In HARE, system dynamics are governed by the behavior of
both the regulator and the robots, consistent with the idea of
shared autonomy (also called shared control [7]). One particu-
larly relevant application of shared control [6] that has parallels
to regulating HARE is human-swarm interaction (HSI) [16, 3].
In HSI, an operator commands or influences a set of robots
that have been programmed to mimic biological swarms. To
do this, each robot in the swarm is equipped with simple
known (to the operator) control algorithms. Despite similari-
ties, HARE differ from traditionally defined robot swarms in
that robots in HARE are programmed by separate stakeholders.
Thus, the algorithms are not likely to be known to the regula-
tor, may be highly sophisticated, and are not guaranteed to be
the same among all robots. As a result, organized, coopera-
tive group behavior can be more difficult to achieve in HARE
than in traditional robot swarms, and different interactions are
likely necessary.
Parameters
Given differences between regulating HARE and other better-
studied systems, we seek to understand how and when HARE
can be effectively regulated. While HARE can be parame-
terized in many ways (including the frequency of decision-
making [37, 14] and the switching processes of system
states [31]), we study two important attributes in this paper:
regulatory power and robot control algorithms.
The jurisdiction and resources given to the regulatory authority
to carry out its intended functions define regulatory power.
Regulatory power determines the interventions the regulator
can use. For example, local laws determine whether a trans-
portation authority is allowed to charge tolls, how or in what
manner it can change tolls, and how it can enforce payment.
Furthermore, monetary resources impact which toll systems
it is able to implement and maintain. Similarly, a utility com-
pany seeking to modulate the behavior of robotic buildings
is limited by laws and resources that govern, among other
things, the information the utility can collect and the pricing
incentives it can successfully implement.
The control algorithms employed by individual robots also
play an important role in HARE. Algorithms differ along many
dimensions, including the data sources utilized by the algo-
rithm, the algorithm’s depth of reasoning, and the algorithm’s
adaptivity. In this paper, we consider how the ability of people
to effectively regulate HARE is impacted by the ability of the
robots to learn from past experiences. We refer to algorithms
that do not adapt as simple automation, and to those that do
adapt based on past experience as adaptive automation.
Assumptions
Regulating HARE is a rather vast topic that we cannot fully
address in a single work. For simplicity, we assume that
regulators use monetary incentives to influence robot behavior
and the regulatory authority consists of a single person. We
also work with simulated environments (environments with
simplified dynamics but which maintain many of the important
characteristics of real-world HARE) to simplify data gathering.
Though not without limitations, these simplifications offer a
reasonable starting point to study various aspects of regulating
HARE. Future work can and should relax these simplifications.
Given these assumptions, we begin to evaluate how regula-
tory power and algorithm adaptivity impact people’s ability to
regulate HARE via a series of user studies.
REGULATION AND ADAPTIVITY
To begin to understand how regulatory power and robot adap-
tivity jointly impact people’s abilities to regulate HARE, we
conducted two user studies in which participants regulated
simulated HARE. In the first study, participants used tolls
to manage a simple transportation system composed of au-
tonomous driverless cars. In the second study, participants
regulated robotic buildings that shared a limited water supply.
Both studies were 2x3 between-subjects designs in which we
varied robot adaptivity and regulatory power.
User Study 1 – Driverless Cars
We study a HARE composed of simulated driverless cars.
Scenario Overview
Simulated autonomous cars used routing algorithms to navi-
gate through a simple transportation network (Figure 1). Cars
traveled at velocities determined by the number of vehicles
on a road. When traffic was below a road’s capacity, cars
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Figure 1. A transportation network represented by a directed graph.
Circled numbers specify road capacity.
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Figure 2. The GUI used in user study 1. Annotations (yellow) are over-
laid for explanatory purposes.
moved at maximum speed. But when traffic approached and
exceeded the road’s capacity, traffic flow slowed to a crawl
(see Appendix A for details).
The regulatory authority was tasked with regulating the driver-
less cars so as to maximize traffic flow through the network,
which was measured as the throughput through node D. To
influence the cars, the regulatory authority set tolls on each
road using a GUI (Figure 2) showing a bird’s-eye view of the
transportation network, including the current location of each
of the 300 cars. The GUI also displayed the number of cars
currently on each road, as well as each road’s capacity. Toll
changes were announced instantaneously to all cars.
Initially, tolls on all roads were set to $0.50. Participants could
increase or decrease each toll (between $0.00 and $0.99) by
clicking on the corresponding buttons. Thus, if road BC was
overcrowded, a regulator might consider trying to reduce the
traffic congestion on this road by increasing the toll on BC,
decreasing the toll on BD, increasing the toll on AB, decreasing
the toll on AC, or using some combination of these methods.
By properly balancing the various tolls, the regulator could
eliminate congestion, which in turn produced high throughput
through node D. Participants could click the buttons in rapid
succession to quickly make large toll changes.
Each robot continually moved through the transportation net-
work, repeatedly selecting a destination node and a route to
that node from its current location so as to maximize its own
utility. A car received positive utility each time it arrived at its
destination, but incurred costs for tolls incurred and a (per unit
time) operational cost. Thus, routes expected to take longer to
Table 1. Factor levels for robot adaptivity, which were defined based on
how travel costs (ct(i,g)) were estimated (Appendix B).
Level Cost Estimation
Simple The cars did not learn from their past experiences.
automation Travel costs were estimated assuming no congestion.
Adaptive All cars used reinforcement learning (based on their
automation own experiences) to determine travel costs.
traverse or that had higher tolls tended to yield lower utility
and were more likely to be avoided by the cars.
Formally, each car estimated its current utility for going to
destination g from its current location i as follows:
u(i,g) = v(g)− ct(i,g)− c$(i,g), (1)
where v(g) was the utility for arriving at destination g, ct(i,g)
was the estimated travel cost for going from the car’s current
location to destination g, and c$(i,g) was the projected toll
charge for going to destination g (see Appendix B for details).
Since neither v(g) nor ct(i,g) (and how they might compare
to c$(i,g)) were known to the regulator (for any car), the
regulator could only determine how tolls might impact the
cars’ behavior through experimentation and observation.
Experimental Setup
We conducted a user study in which people regulated 300
simulated cars. In this study, we varied both robot adaptivity
and regulatory power to determine how these two variables
jointly impact people’s ability to effectively regulate HARE.
As summarized in Table 1, robot adaptivity contained two
factor levels indicating the type of navigation system used by
all the cars: simple automation and adaptive automation. In
both cases, each car used Dijkstra’s Algorithm and Eq. (1)
to determine which path to follow. However, the cars used
different mechanisms to estimate travel costs (ct(i,g)). Cars
that used simple automation estimated travel costs assuming
a congestion-free network. On the other hand, cars that used
adaptive automation estimated travel costs on each road using
reinforcement learning (Appendix B). Thus, cars that used
simple automation did not learn from their past experiences
(and, hence, only reacted to toll changes), whereas cars that
used adaptive automation learned over time.
We considered three levels of regulator power: none, limited
and unlimited (Table 2). For no regulatory power, no toll
changes were permitted (no participants needed). When given
unlimited regulatory power, participants could change tolls
as frequently and as much as they desired. However, under
limited regulatory power, participants were given a budget
which limited the total amount of toll changes. Initially, partic-
ipants received a toll-change fund of $0.30, which increased
by $0.007 each second. Thus, the total toll-change budget for
a 25-minute game was $10.80. The absolute value of each toll
change was subtracted from the budget. Toll changes were not
permitted that caused the budget to drop below zero.
Protocol
Forty-eight students and research staff from Masdar Institute
participated in the study. The following protocol was followed:
Table 2. Factor levels for regulatory power.
Level Description
None No toll changes were allowed.
Limited Regulators had a budget which limited the amount of toll
changes they could make.
Unlimited Regulators could change tolls as much as they desired.
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Figure 3. Average throughput observed in user study 1. Error bars show
the standard error of the mean.
• The participants were randomly and uniformly assigned
across four conditions: Simple-Limited, Adaptive-Limited,
Simple-Unlimited, or Adaptive-Unlimited.
• The participant was trained on how to play the game in
the designated condition, but with cars that chose routes
randomly. This training continued until the participant felt
comfortable with the objectives of the game, the user inter-
face, and how to set tolls.
• The participant played a 25-minute game. Initially, the
cars were randomly distributed across the four nodes in the
network, which immediately caused congestion to develop
on several roads. The participant needed to bring the sys-
tem to a congestion-free state as quickly as possible. Cars
were biased so that more cars preferred node C as a destina-
tion. To incentivize high performance, a high-score list was
displayed once the game completed.
• The participant completed a post-experiment questionnaire,
which asked which node more cars preferred and whether
or not the cars employed learning algorithms.
Twelve trials for both the Simple-None and Adaptive-None
conditions were also carried out (no participants required).
Results
Figure 3 shows the average performance of the HARE, mea-
sured as a percentage of optimal throughput over the duration
of the game, achieved in each condition. Absent regulations,
societies of driverless cars equipped with adaptive automation
performed much better than societies of cars using simple
automation. However, limited regulatory power reversed this
trend. Limited regulatory power led to vastly better outcomes
for societies composed of simple robots, but had no impact
on societies comprised of adaptive robots. While additional
(unlimited) regulatory power improved the efficiency of adap-
tive societies by a small amount, it decreased throughput for
societies comprised of simple robots.
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Figure 4. Data from user study 1. (a) Toll adjustments made per sec-
ond. (b) The number of participants that correctly deduced in the post-
experiment questionnaire (top) the node most preferred by the cars and
(bottom) whether or not the autonomous cars were learning.
An analysis of variance, where throughput was the depen-
dent variable and robot adaptivity and regulatory power
were independent variables, confirmed many of these trends.
This analysis showed a main affect for regulatory power
(F(1,66) = 30.47, p < 0.001), but not for robot adaptivity
(F(2,66) = 0.32, p = 0.572). However, there was an interac-
tion affect between robot adaptivity and regulatory power
(F(2,66) = 23.15, p < 0.001). Tukey post hoc analysis
showed that simple automation with no regulation was worse
than all other conditions (p < 0.001), while simple automa-
tion with limited regulatory power was better than all other
conditions (p≤ 0.03 for each pairing). Regulatory power had
no significant impact on societies of adaptive robots.
We attribute the unanticipated drop in performance between
the Simple-Limited to the Simple-Unlimited conditions to
overuse of regulatory resources, which in turn led to partici-
pants having poorer models of the HARE. To see this, consider
Figure 4a, which shows the amount of toll adjustments made
by participants per second in the first user study. Unsurpris-
ingly, substantially more toll adjustments were made by regu-
lators who had unlimited regulatory power. While additional
toll adjustments may have been justified in the case of adaptive
automation, additional interventions were unnecessary when
robots used simple automation. While in the Simple-Limited
conditions participants were forced to wait before making
more toll changes due to a limited budget, many participants
did not do so in the Simple-Unlimited condition. Rather, they
continually made toll adjustments without waiting sufficient
time for the robots to adjust [39]. Thus, they were largely un-
able to effectively identify which node more robots preferred
(Figure 4b-top) and whether or not the robots were learning
(Figure 4b-bottom). Thus, limited resources appear to have
encouraged observation and were, hence, beneficial.
In summary, moderate levels of regulatory power combined
with non-adaptive robots had the highest social welfare. We
now consider a second scenario to get a second data point.
User Study 2 – Robotic Buildings
In this study, participants regulated the activity of tenants in a
robotic buildings that shared a limited water supply.
Water tank level
Utility 
indicators
Aggregate
Individual
Price controls and 
consumption indicators
Unfulfilled activities 
indicator
Figure 5. The (annotated) GUI used in study 2.
Scenario Overview
Eight (simulated) tenants of an apartment building shared a
limited water resource. Each tenant’s apartment was equipped
with robotic devices that automatically scheduled and executed
water-related activities (e.g., laundry, dish-washing, etc.) on
behalf of the tenant. A tenant programmed its own devices
to execute activities automatically using a control algorithm.
Water supplied to the building was collected and purified via a
renewable-energy source, a process that limited water avail-
ability such that water needs exceeded supply (Appendix C).
The regulator’s job was to set the per-unit cost of water in
each time period (we assumed a day with six time periods)
each day such that the aggregate utility across all tenants, days,
and periods was maximized. Participants set prices using
the GUI pictured in Figure 5, which, in addition to allowing
participants to change prices, displayed the current water level,
the amount of water consumed per period, the number and
value of tasks shed by the robotic devices, and the aggregate
and individual happiness of the tenants.
Each tenant employed a control algorithm designed to max-
imize its total utility. The water needs of each tenant were
defined by a set of activities. Activity i was defined by the 4-
tuple (ts(i), t f (i),s(i),v(i)), where the time interval [ts(i), t f (i))
defined the time window during which activity i could be ex-
ecuted, s(i) was the amount of water consumed by activity i,
and v(i) was how much the tenant valued the completion of
activity i. When activity i was carried out, the tenant received
utility u(i) = v(i)− c(i), where c(i) = s(i)p(t) was the cost
for executing activity i and p(t) was the per-unit cost of water
set by the regulator for period t.
Since the tenants’ water-related activities (and how the utilities
might compare to c(i)) were unknown to the regulator, the
regulator could only determine what prices to set through
experimentation and observation.
Experimental Setup
We considered societies in which (1) devices used simple (non-
adaptive) algorithms and (2) devices used adaptive algorithms
to schedule activities. As summarized in Table 3, simple
algorithms executed any activity with positive utility when
water was available. They did not adapt their behavior based
on their experience. On the other hand, adaptive algorithms
shifted their tenant’s activity schedules based on estimates of
water availability and price in each time period (Appendix D)
to maximize the tenant’s expected utility. We evaluated the
same three levels of regulatory power as in Study 1 (Table 4).
Table 3. Factor levels for robot adaptivity. See Appendix D for details.
Level Decision Making Process
Simple The robotic building carried out activity i if and only if
auto- ui > 0 and there was sufficient water for the activity.
mation The building did not shift activities based on experience.
Adaptive The robotic building shifted water-related activities to
auto- maximize its tenant’s estimated utilities, which were
mation based on estimated hourly prices and water availability.
Estimates of hourly prices and water availability were
based on observations made in previous days.
Table 4. Factor levels for regulatory power.
Level Description
None No price changes were allowed.
Limited Participants were allowed to change prices no more than
three times per day (by a single increment).
Unlimited Participants were free to change prices as often and as
much as they desired.
Protocol
Forty students and research staff (mean age: 26) from Mas-
dar Institute volunteered for the study. The participants were
randomly and uniformly assigned to the same four conditions
as in Study 1. Each participant was taught, via a slide pre-
sentation, how to play the game in the assigned condition.
The participant then played the game in a practice scenario
in which robot devices made choices randomly. Finally, the
participant played a simulated 30-day game. Ten trials for
both the Adaptive-None and Simple-None conditions were
also conducted (no human subjects required).
Results
Participants were asked to set prices so as to maximize the ag-
gregate utility of all tenant’s over time. The average aggregate
utility, plotted as a percentage of optimal utility, achieved in
each condition is shown in Figure 6. As in Study 1, limited
regulatory power produced higher social welfare in the case
of simple, non-adaptive, automation. Unlimited regulatory
power likewise produced lower aggregate utility than limited
regulatory power when robots used simple automation. Both
limited and unlimited regulatory power led to substantially
lower performance when robots used adaptive algorithms.
Statistical analysis confirms these trends. A two-way anal-
ysis of variance, with aggregate utility over the last 5 days
as the dependent variable and robot adaptivity and regulatory
power as the independent variables, shows a main affect for
both regulatory power (F(1,54) = 18.39, p < 0.001), and
robot adaptivity (F(1,54) = 53.53, p < 0.001). There was
also a significant interaction affect between robot adaptivity
and regulatory power (F(2,66) = 22.91, p < 0.001). Tukey
post hoc analysis shows that, when robots used simple automa-
tion, limited regulatory power led to a significant improve-
ment over no regulatory power (p = 0.037) and unlimited
regulatory power (p < 0.001). Simple-Limited was also statis-
tically better than Adaptive-Limited and Adaptive-Unlimited
(p < 0.001), and Simple-Unlimited was better than Adaptive-
Unlimited (p = 0.023). Finally, any regulation decreased the
performance of societies of adaptive robots (p < 0.001).
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Figure 6. Average aggregate utility during days 26-30 in user study 2
(water management). Error bars show the standard error of the mean.
USER STUDY 3 – SUPPORTING REGULATORS
The user studies described in the previous section evaluated
two specific HARE. Interestingly, outcomes from both studies
tell a similar story: high regulatory power combined with
adaptive robots produced less efficient HARE. On the surface,
these results are counter-intuitive, as both innovations seem
to offer more. Theoretically, increased regulatory power gives
the regulator more leverage over the HARE. In practice, too
much regulatory power appears to have diverted the regulator
away from effectively modeling the HARE. Similarly, adaptive
control algorithms allow robots to, theoretically, adapt to each
other, thus potentially moving the HARE towards cooperative
solutions. In practice, it appears that the increased complexity
of adaptive robots made it more difficult for participants to
model (and, thus, influence) these HARE.
While both high regulatory power and adaptive robot control
algorithms failed in the previous two studies, they may add
value to the HARE under the right circumstances. One possi-
bility is to assist the regulator in modeling the HARE. Thus,
we next consider a third user study in which we gave the regu-
lator automated support in the form of a warning system [18]
that forecasted the future state of the HARE, and warned the
regulator of potentially undesirable future events. We again
consider the driverless-car scenario used in Study 1.
Scenario Overview
We used a discrete-event simulation (DES) to forecast the
future status of each road in the network. To do this, the sys-
tem modeled the percentage of cars that chose each road at
each node. These percentages, along with the number of cars
currently on each road, were used to simulate the network 20
seconds in advance. The resulting simulation correctly pre-
dicted changes in future system states approximately 80% of
the time. If the estimated number of cars on a road exceeded
the road’s capacity at any time during the simulation, then the
corresponding road was highlighted in red on the GUI. Simi-
larly, if the estimated number of cars on a road was between
75-100%, the road was highlighted in yellow on the GUI.
Experimental Setup and Protocol
The experimental setup and protocol was identical to our first
user study, with the exception that participants were warned
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Figure 7. System throughput with and without forecasting.
Table 5. # of subjects that correctly identified the node preference and
vehicle type with (Yes) and without (No) forecasting.
Node Preference Vehicle Type
Condition No / Yes No / Yes
Simple-Limited 9 / 3 8 / 6
Simple-Unlimited 7 / 5 1 / 3
Adaptive-Limited 6 / 7 7 / 9
Adaptive-Unlimited 5 / 5 6 / 8
of pending congestion. Forty-eight participants (mean age:
28) participated this study. Twelve subjects were randomly
assigned to each condition.
Results
Figure 7 compares the average system throughput obtained
when participants were given the warning system verses when
they were not. In most conditions, the decision support system
had little impact on the resulting performance of the HARE.
The only exception was in the Simple-Limited condition,
where the warning system actually appears to have decreased
throughput. A two-way independent-samples t-test confirms
this observation. In the Simple-Limited condition, the warn-
ing system significantly decreased throughput (M = −1.31,
SD = 1.81); t(21.743) =−2.55, p = 0.019.
The post-experiment questionnaire highlights a potential ex-
planation for the failure of the warning system. In the Simple-
Limited condition, participants given the warning system had
a poorer model of the HARE than those that were not given the
warning system (Table 5). With the warning system, just three
of the twelve participants in the Simple-Limited condition
correctly identified which node more cars preferred, whereas
nine of the twelve participants without the warning system
correctly identified the preferred node.
Rather than learning the HARE’s tendencies, it appears that
some participants instead depended on the forecasting system
to identify when congestion was likely to occur. Since the
warning system did not supply instructions for how to alleviate
the problem [18], these participants did not know what to do
once a potential problem was identified – they did not have
sufficient knowledge of the HARE’s underlying tendencies.
In short, the decision-support system likewise failed to help
the system take advantage of additional regulatory power and
adaptive automation, and in fact appears to have made things
worse. The forecasting system identified symptoms of the
underlying system, but did not help the regulator model the
HARE. This negative result potentially highlights the role that
a decision-support system should play in overcoming the dif-
ficulties of adaptive robots and high regulatory power. We
anticipate that decision-support systems for HARE should
focus on either helping the regulator to (1) form an appropri-
ate model of robot behavior or to (2) balance the time spent
modeling and implementing interventions.
SYSTEM-SPECIFIC OR GENERAL TRENDS?
The results from the user studies reveal somewhat counter-
intuitive trends about specific HARE. In particular, limited
regulatory power combined with HARE with simple automa-
tion produced the best results. Would we expect these trends
to generalize to other scenarios and systems, including HARE
that used different adaptive control algorithms, were regulated
by more or less experienced regulators, or that provided the
regulator with different user interfaces? While future work is
required to answer these questions in full, we seek to begin
to understand the forces that impact the ability of people to
regulate HARE. To do this, we use a simple mathematical
model of the regulator to identify the following three general
principles that appear to be influential in bringing about the
results observed in our user studies.
Principle 1: Adaptive robot behaviors typically require the
regulator to spend more time modeling the system.
Principle 2: Adaptive robots typically require the regulator to
have higher regulatory power to effectively model the HARE.
Principle 3: Increased regulatory power tends to decrease the
time the regulator spends modeling the HARE.
These principles appear to be applicable to all HARE, though
the design of the HARE could impact the degree to which they
are manifest. We discuss each in turn.
Principle 1: To model robot behavior, the regulator must un-
derstand how the robots will collectively react to each situation
(st ,ht), where st is the current state of the system at time t and
ht = (i0, · · · , it−1) is the intervention history the regulator has
implemented up to time t. Here, ik is the intervention carried
out at time k. LetM (s,h, i) describe how the robots will react
when the regulator issues intervention i given system state s
and intervention history h.
Since the robots’ behavior is unknown a priori to the regulator,
the regulator must estimateM (s,h, i) by observing the robots
for each (s,h, i) 3-tuple. The robot’s control algorithms impact
the amount of time that must be given to forming the model
M (s,h, i). In line with neglect benevolence [39], less time is
required to model robots that use stationary decision-making
processes than adaptive ones, since adaptive algorithms first
adapt to the new intervention, and then react to the reactions
of other robots to the intervention, and so on.
Adaptive automation also requires the operator to make more
observations than simple automation. Stationary decision-
making processes are typically only contingent on the current
system state s, whereas adaptive ones are contingent on the
tuple (s,h). Thus, regulators must model a larger state space.
Principle 2: As discussed for Principle 1, adaptive algorithms
require regulators to model the functionM (s,h, i) rather than
the simpler functionM (s, i). Since this model is constructed
by observations that require the regulator to implement some
intervention i, regulators of HARE in which robots use adap-
tive algorithms must have more regulatory resources to imple-
ment the necessary interventions.
Principle 3: More regulatory power means that regulators
(a) select from a larger set of possible interventions and
(b) have the ability to implement a greater number of inter-
ventions. Having more options can obviously be beneficial,
but it comes at the cost of requiring the regulator to spend
more time finding the best intervention among all its choices.
Furthermore, implementing a greater number of interventions
takes more of the regulator’s time (e.g., Figure 4a). Since the
regulator must divide its time between modeling the HARE,
computing effective interventions, and implementing these
interventions, both of these trends mean that more regulator
power can reduce the amount of time the regulator spends
modeling the system. This, in turn, can lead to a poorer model
of the HARE, as was observed in study 1 (Figure 4b).
The forces introduced as Principles 1-3 do not necessarily
mean that adaptive control algorithms or more regulator power
are always bad. We anticipate that both developments can still
add value when measures are taken to counteract these forces.
Future work should identify how to best do so.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented and discussed the results of
three user studies in which people regulated simulated highly
automated robot ecologies (HARE). These studies provide
data points that give potential insights into how we can design
systems that allow people to regulate HARE so that they meet
societal objectives. Though these data points only provide
samples of specific HARE, they highlight easily encountered
pitfalls in the design of HARE: seemingly desirable regulatory
power, decision support, or adaptive robot autonomy can all
lead to HARE with diminished social welfare. Our results
suggest that designers of Human-HARE systems should base
design decisions regarding decision support and regulatory
power on helping regulators to identify and understand the
underlying dynamics of the HARE rather than fixating on con-
trolling current or future system states. Simultaneously, these
data points suggest that designers of HARE should consider
limiting the complexity of algorithms used by robots in the
HARE, or at least to make the algorithms more immediately
transparent to regulators, as simple robot autonomy coupled
with limited regulatory power produced the best results.
While illuminating, we must be careful to not overstate the
generality of these results, which were obtained for specific
(simulated) systems. Varying any attribute of these systems
(e.g., the skill and experience of the regulators; the algorithms,
hardware, and information used by the robots; and the com-
munication environment itself) could impact the results. Our
studies are intended to begin to raise awareness of impor-
tant issues and general principles that should be understood,
weighed, and (where necessary) appropriately counteracted as
we design real-world HARE. Future work is needed to better
understand, work with, and expound upon these principles.
APPENDIX
A. Studies 1 and 3 – Road Physics: Congestion occurred
when the number of cars on the road exceeded the road’s capac-
ity. A car’s speed on road i j was Vi j ∝ [1/(1+e0.25(Ni j−Ci j))]+
0.1, where Ci j and Ni j were the capacity and the current num-
ber of cars on road i j, respectively. Thus, as traffic volume
reached the road’s capacity, traffic flow slowed substantially.
B. Studies 1 and 3 – Robot Behavior: Each simulated car
tried to maximize its estimated expected utility, which was
based on Eq. (1). A new set of destination utilities v(g) for
each node g ∈ {A,B,C,D} was generated randomly from a
normal distribution each time a car reached its selected desti-
nation. Formally, v(g) =N (b(g)+ r[0,1],0.1+0.3(r[0,1]),
where r[0,1] denotes a uniform random selection from the in-
terval [0,1], and b(g) = 0.6 for g ∈ {A,B,D} and b(C) = 0.8.
This created a preference across the HARE for node C.
The estimated travel cost c$(i,g) (Eq. 1) was the sum of in-
dividual link costs along the shortest path to the destination.
Let c$(i, j) (defined for adjacent nodes i and j) denote the
estimated cost for traveling from i to j. Then, for cars using
simple automation, c$(i, j) = y · xi j, where y = 0.079 was the
operating cost per unit time, xi j = Li j/Si j, Li j was the length
of road i j, and Si j was the car’s max speed.
Cars employing adaptive automation used reinforcement learn-
ing to estimate travel costs. Initially, c$(i, j) was set as in sim-
ple automation. Thereafter, each time a car finished traversing
road i j, it updated xi j such that xi j = αxi j +(1−α)z, where
α ∈ [0,1] was chosen randomly for each car, and z was the
observed time to traverse road i j.
C. Study 2 – System Properties: Each day was divided into
six periods, and each tenant had one potential activity per time
period. The water tank refilled at a variable rate throughout
the day, such that the water-refill rate was defined by the vec-
tor w = (0,40,50,60,30,0) (measured in water units). Since
the consumers wished to consume 300 water units per day
in aggregate, demand exceeded supply. Thus, the regulator
needed to learn to set prices, via trial and error, so that water
was available when the consumers had high-valued activities,
which tended to be at the beginning and ending of the day.
D. Study 2 – Robot Behavior Formally, let L(d,h) be the
amount of water available to a robotic building on day d, pe-
riod h. Then, for day D, hour H, the robotic building estimates
the water level to be L′(D,H) = 1/(D−1)∑D−1d=1 L(d,H). Ad-
ditionally, let p(d,h) be the price of water on day d, period
h. Then, the tenant estimates the price of water on day d+1,
period h to be p′(d+1,h) = p(d,h).
After the first day, adaptive automation shifted the ten-
ant’s activities in day d so as to maximize expected utility.
If L′(d,τ) > s(τ − t), then let x(d,τ, t) = max(0,y(d,τ, t)),
where y(d,τ, t) = v(τ − t) − s(τ − t)p′(d, t). Otherwise,
x(d,τ, t) = 0. Then, the tenant’s schedule is shifted in day
d by t∗(d) = argmaxt∈[0,5]∑6τ=1 x(d,τ, t) time periods.
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